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Abstract 
On 16 September 2016, the Swaziland High Court delivered judgment in the matter between 
Maseko and others v Prime Minister of Swaziland and others [2016] SZHC 180, in which it 
declared certain provisions of the Suppression of terrorism Act (2008); and the Sedition and 
Subversive Activities Act (1938) as unconstitutional. The Declaration followed a constitutional 
challenge, based on the applicants’ freedom of expression, assembly and association. The 
judgment was unprecedented in the Swaziland context, given that of the four applicants, 
three were political activists and one was a Human Rights lawyer. All four have been in 
frequent collision with the government over their political opinions. Two judges ruled in 
favour of the applicants, whilst the third one ruled against them. The judgment was a sharp 
departure from past decisions, where the courts often ruled in favour of the state, leaving 
many litigants without a remedy. The ruling marked the first time a Swazi court had declared 
the Swaziland Constitution a living document. However commendable the main judgment, 
the dissenting opinion raises several constitutional questions that need to be addressed. 
This article therefore, critically analyses the dissenting opinion of Justice Hlophe, and seeks 
to demonstrate that his approach is antithetical to constitutionalism, and is irreconcilable 
with accepted notions of Bill of Rights litigation. 
 
Introduction 
In the later part of 2016, the High Court sitting in Mbabane, Swaziland, handed down 
judgment in a landmark case, in which it declared as unconstitutional certain provisions that 
form the backbone of Swaziland’s so-called anti-terrorism legislation. These were various 
sections of the Suppression of Terrorism Act 3 of 2008, and the Sedition and Subversive 
Activities Act 46 of 1938. The matter arose after several individuals were charged under 
these two Acts, after they had made certain utterances, and displayed certain writings on 
their own t-shirts. It was alleged that they had uttered words such as Phansi ngeTinkhundla 
Phansi (“Down with the Tinkhundla System of Government Down”) and Viva PUDEMO 
Viva. If convicted, all four would each face up to 20 years in prison without the option of a 
fine. The applicants were Thulani Maseko (a human rights lawyer), Maxwell Dlamini (a 
political student activist), Mario Masuku (a political activist and leader of a banned 
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opposition party styled as People’s United Democratic Movement [PUDEMO]), and 
Mlungisi Makhanya (a political activist). All except Maseko, were members of PUDEMO. 
All of them have been routinely arrested and charged over the years for some or other 
offences relating to freely expressing their views, or for associating and assembling with 
like-minded individuals. Their political activities often put them on a collision course with 
the state, which regards political parties as banned under a royal decree that survived the 
new Constitution, the King’s Proclamation to the Nation on 12 April 1973. Through this royal 
decree, the then King, Sobhuza II unilaterally abrogated the Independence Constitution, 
which did not have any clauses regulating its repeal, save for provisions regulating its 
amendment. He announced the repeal and at the same time proclaimed that 
 
I further declare that, to ensure the continued maintenance of peace, order and good 
government, my Armed Forces in conjunction with the Swaziland Royal Police have been 
posted to all strategic places and have taken charge of all government places and all public 
services. 
 
In paragraph 11 of the Proclamation, the King decreed that, “All political parties and similar 
bodies that cultivate and bring about disturbances and ill-feelings within the Nation are 
hereby dissolved and prohibited.” 
 
It would seem that political activity runs counter to the concept of “monarchical 
democracy”, which the King of Swaziland propounded before the United Nations in 2013 
(General Assembly of the UN 2013). In terms of this form of democracy, there is a “marriage 
between the monarchy and the ballot box”. The ballot box is regarded as the will of the 
people, which provides advice and counsel to the King and serves to ensure transparency and 
accountability. This is a form of democracy that the applicants were opposing, when they 
were charged with terrorism and sedition. 
 
A brief treatment of the main judgment 
The main judgment, written by Mamba J, with Annandale J concurring, was a progressive one. 
It regarded the Constitution as a Living Document (para 41). The main judgment provides a 
step by step analysis of how the Bill of Rights litigation in the Swaziland context plays itself 
out. In that regard, it starts with a discussion of locus standi, before considering the two 
rights under discussion, namely freedom of expression and freedom of association. It proceeds 
to deal with the issue of limitation of rights, in which it relies on comparative jurisprudence 
from other jurisdictions, including South Africa. 
 
Section 35 on Standing 
Judges Mamba and Annandale took judicial notice of the fact that the applicants were 
charged with various crimes under the two impugned Acts, and that they were now 
challenging the constitutionality of those provisions. Based on this, they agreed with the 
applicants’ contention that they had standing before court. Section 35(1) of the Swaziland 
Constitution governs the issue of locus standi. It provides that where a person alleges that any 





has been, is being, or is likely to be, contravened in relation to that person or a group of 
which that person is a member (or in the case of a person who is detained, where any other 
person alleges such a contravention in relation to the detained person) then, … that 
person (or that other person) may apply to the High Court for redress (emphasis 
added). 
 
By virtue of section 35(2) (a) of the Constitution, the High Court has original jurisdiction to 
hear a matter brought in terms of subsection (1); in other words, a constitutional 
challenge. This position, taken by the majority judgment differs from that of the 
dissenting judge, as will be shown below. 
 
Section 24 on expression 
Section 24 governs freedom of expression and opinion. In subsection (2), it stipulates that a 
person shall not be deprived of this right without his free consent. This provision denotes 
that the individual can waive his right, but such waiver must be freely given. The individual 
must not be coerced, neither must he be deceived into giving up his freedom of 
expression. The Constitution recognises that this right includes freedom of the press and 
other media, and the freedom to hold opinions without interference; to receive and impart 
ideas and information without interference, as well as protection against interference with 
one’s correspondence. Interestingly, and especially for this politically charged case, the 
freedom to impart and receive information includes all forms of communication, whether 
the communication be to the public generally or to any person or class of persons (section 
24(2) (c)). This provision was informed by the need to protect dissenting voices in the 
Swaziland context, which had been systematically silenced by draconian pieces of Legislation 
under the colonial regime, as well as in the post-independence era, where the King ruled by a 
supreme royal decree. 
 
Section 24(3) contains the internal limitation of the right to freedom of expression. It provides 
that 
 
Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent 
with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the law in question makes 
provision— (a) that is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public safety, public 
order, public morality or public health. 
 
The provision goes on to stipulate that the limiting measure or law must be reasonably 
required for any of the four purposes that are listed below. The operative word here is the 
“reasonableness” of the limiting measure. This means that a law which is required for any of 
the listed purposes will fail the constitutionality test, where it is proved to be unreasonable. 
The four purposes that a limiting measure must be aimed at serving are: 
 
1. protection of the reputations, rights and freedoms of others or the private lives of 




2. preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence; 
3. maintaining the authority and independence of the courts; 
4. regulating the technical administration of operation of telephony, telegraphy, posts, 
wireless broadcasting or television or any other medium of communication. 
 
Also protected are laws that impose reasonable restrictions on public officers (section 24(3) 
(c). This provision seems to have been influenced by the desire to protect state secrets, 
preventing public officers from divulging certain information that they come into contact with 
as part of their work. Again, here the emphasis is on the term “reasonable”. The same section 
proceeds to give guidance on how to determine if a limiting measure is justifiable or not. The 
proviso to section 24(3) reads thus: 
 
except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing done under the authority of 
that law is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. 
 
In terms of the Swaziland limitation analysis, the court ought to embark on a two- stage 
enquiry. (i) The first leg involves the determination of whether a right in the Bill of Rights 
has been infringed. Once that is found to be the case, the next question is whether such 
infringement came by way of a law (section 24(3)).  
 
After the offending law is identified, the court can then move on to the second leg of the 
enquiry. Where the infringement did not occur under the authority of any law, the 
enquiry ends there; 
 
The limitation cannot pass the constitutionality test. (ii) The second leg comes into play once 
the law is identified, under which the violation occurred. At the commencement of this stage 
of the enquiry the court must answer the following question: What was the Purpose of the 
Limitation for which the Law was Passed? This could be any of the five purposes listed in 
section 24(3) (b) and (c), as well as section 25(3) (b) and (c). If the law is found to be unsuited 
to that purpose, the enquiry stops there, because a purposeless law cannot be 
constitutionally justified. If it is established that the law serves any of the four listed purposes, 
the court must then determine if, even in light of its stated purpose, that law can be justified in 
a democratic society. In other words, the law must introduce a reasonable limitation of the 
right that would be found to be reasonable in a democratic society. 
 
In the final analysis, three things are required in the Bill of Rights litigation in Swaziland: 
1. The limitation must be provided for by law; 
2. The limitation must pursue one of the specific purposes set out in sections 23 and 
24; 
3. The limitation must be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. 
 
The reasoning in the main judgment followed this approach, and came to the conclusion that 




of opinion on who bears the onus of proving that the limiting measure is not reasonable and 
therefore, not justifiable in a democratic society. 
 
Section 25 on Assembly and Association 
Section 25(1) and (2) provides that a person has the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and association; and that this right cannot be taken away from the person 
enjoying it without that person’s free consent. In subsection (3), the internal limitation is 
introduced, in similar wording to the section 24(3) text. Subsection (4) goes further to provide 
for yet another limitation clause, which largely targeted juristic persons such as trade unions, 
and by extension, political parties. It provides that a limiting measure shall not be in conflict 
with the Constitution to the extent that it makes provision: 
 
for the registration of trade unions, employers’ organisations, companies, partnerships … 
and other associations including provision relating to the procedure for registration, 
prescribing qualifications for registration and authoring refusal of registration on the 
grounds that the prescribed qualifications are not fulfilled; or for prohibiting or restricting 
the performance of any function or the carrying on of any business by any such association 
as is mentioned in paragraph (a) which is not registered. 
 
Limitation analysis 
Unlike the South African Constitution’s section 36, the Swaziland Constitution does not have a 
general limitation clause. Instead, it relies solely on internal limitations contained within the 
particular provision sanctioning each right. As seen above, the two rights under discussion 
also have internal limitations. The South African provision reads thus: 
 
1. The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of a law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all 
relevant factors, including: 
• the nature of the right; 
• the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
• the nature and extent of the limitation; 
• the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
• less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
2. Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no 
law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
Notably, the limitation of the two freedoms in the Swaziland context subject the 
enjoyment of these rights to interests of defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality or public health. Whilst these instances accord with Article 19(3) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Swaziland acceded to in 2004, 
they were not meant to give the state carte blanche for human rights violations. In General 





when a [s]tate party imposes restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression, these may 
not put in jeopardy the right itself...the relation between right and restriction and between 
norm and exception must not be reversed. 
 
Putting the Dissent Judgment in Perspective 
Hlophe J’s dissenting opinion differs from the approach taken in the main judgment. To 
begin with, the Judge did not engage in a sequential analysis of the various steps that need 
to be satisfied in a case where the constitutionality of any law is challenged. Instead, he 
conflated issues, created new principles in vacuo, and totally misread previous decisions 
of the Swaziland High Court. Hlophe J’s opinion failed to take into consideration the spirit of 
the Bill of Rights and the context within which it operates. The Judge’s opinion seems to be 
heavily steeped in or influenced by mixed notions of absolutism and parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
 
In addition, Hlophe J avoided dealing with the issue of standing at all. It is safe to assume 
that he agreed with the main judgment’s approach to the issue of standing, and simply 
proceeded to lay out the reasons why the application should fail. It is worth noting that in his 
treatment of the application, the Bill of Rights was not central at all. He simply proceeded with 
the matter as if it was heard in the pre-constitutional era. Quite ironically, the criminal trials 
of the applicants had been scheduled to be heard at the High Court by Hlophe J, before the 
applicants decided to attack the constitutionality of the sections under which they were 
charged, thereby halting the criminal proceedings. 
 
Hlophe J described the remedy sought by the applicants, using emotive language, referring 
to it as an “extreme remedy” (para 5). From the outset, it was clear that the Judge did not 
believe that the case ought to have come before his court. In paras 16–20, Judge Hlophe 
detailed why he believed the matter was a criminal one, and ought to have been dealt with 
by the criminal court and not the constitutional court. He invoked what he termed “a long 
established principle that a matter capable of a decision or determination on any other 
ground than a constitutional one” ought to be resolved using the former. For this, he relied on 
the South African case of Qwelane v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 2015 (2) 
SA 493(GJ) at para 10. 
 
The major problem with this approach is that the Qwelane case involved an Equality 
court matter, not a criminal matter. In fact, the Qwelane court had to deal with a novel 
question of law. The court had to determine whether it is competent for a judge of the High 
Court to hear Equality Court proceedings and High Court proceedings simultaneously, based 
on a constitutional challenge in one consolidated case. In other words, whether the Judge 
could serve a dual role, in his capacity as High Court judge and Equality Court judge. In the 
final analysis, the Qwelane court issued an order to the effect that the Equality Court 
proceedings and the constitutional challenge proceedings should be consolidated for hearing 





The Equality Court is not a Criminal court. It has been described as “a special animal”, “a 
special purpose vehicle” (Manong and Associates (Pty) Ltd v Department of Roads and 
Transport, EC and Others (No2) 2009 (6) SA 589 (SCA) para 57). On the one hand, it is a 
specialist court with exclusive jurisdiction on equality matters, such as the relief sought in 
that case. The constitutional challenge, on the other hand, could not be brought before the 
Equality Court, since only the High Court and the courts above it have constitutional 
jurisdiction. 
 
Consolidation in the Swaziland context would not work for the following reason: the 
minimum number of judges required to hear a constitutional challenge at the Swaziland 
High Court is three. This is not the case in South Africa. The purpose of consolidation of 
actions before the High Court is to provide for a single hearing of substantially similar 
issues in order to avoid a multiplicity of trials. The prospects of Hlophe J, as trial judge, 
raising these constitutional matters mero motu were also very slim, given his demonstrated 
aversion to constitutional claims. 
 
In para 20 of his dissenting judgment, Hlophe J seems to jettison the applicants’ case simply 
because he does not believe the trial court would have come to the conclusion that the 
applicants uttered terrorist slogans in violation of the impugned legislation. Even though 
Judge Hlophe was scheduled to be the trial judge, absent any evidence in the criminal trial 
itself, it can be argued that his conclusion is based on conjecture. The court was not called 
upon to decide the guilt or otherwise of the applicants. His reasoning seems to suggest that the 
applicants should have allowed the criminal trial to first run its course, and if they were 
acquitted, there would be no need to challenge the two Acts (para 36). Only if they were 
found guilty would they, in the judge’s opinion, be in a position to challenge the 
constitutionality of the two pieces of legislation (para 37). To make a determination on the 
constitutionality or otherwise of the impugned provisions before the conclusion of the 
criminal trial would, in the words of the judge, “have been unnecessary and premature.” This 
line of reasoning is flawed in many respects. 
 
First, the Bill of Rights in the Swaziland Constitution does not only offer ex post facto 
protection of fundamental rights. Hence the wording of the clause on standing, section 
35(1), is alive to that fact. The section entitles the beneficiary of a right whose right has been, 
is being, or is likely to be contravened, to approach the High Court for redress. The 
applicants’ rights to freedom of expression and assembly and association were already 
threatened by the criminal charges preferred against them. To expect them to first go 
through the criminal trial before approaching court indicates a failure to appreciate the 
reach and ambit of section 35 on standing. Secondly, the authority upon which the judge 
relied uses the words “where possible.” This effectively means there is no carte blanche rule 
that matters capable of being determined on any other ground than a constitutional one 
should be settled on that other ground. The operative words here are “where possible.” This 
denotes that the court must engage in a weighing up of the issues before it, to determine what 
impact its decision will have on the applicant if it decides that the matter should be 




balance of convenience. In other words, the court must be alive to the prejudice which the 
applicant will likely suffer if the matter is not decided on constitutional grounds. 
 
Conflating Ripeness and Mootness? 
Judge Hlophe concluded that the application was abstract (para 21), without 
demonstrating exactly how abstract it was. It is our contention that the applicants’ case was 
not abstract at all. Furthermore, it is our argument that even if the matter was an abstract 
one, it is of such public importance, taking into account the history of repression and alleged 
human rights violations in the Swaziland context that the interests of justice favoured 
proceeding with the hearing. However, it is imperative to demonstrate what an abstract or 
moot case is. 
 
It seems trite that the law frowns upon the institution of abstract cases. It was stated in 
Ainsbury v Millington [1987] 1 All ER 929 (HL) at 930g that, “It has always been a 
fundamental feature of our judicial system that the courts decide disputes between the 
parties before them; they do not pronounce on abstract questions of law where there is no 
dispute to be resolved.” This is because courts do not want to give legal advice gratuitously, 
and thereby waste limited resources and time. 
 
A matter will, generally speaking, be considered abstract if the order of the court will not 
have any practical effect on any of the parties. Such a matter is considered academic or 
hypothetical, a mere legal or advisory opinion. This could be the case where no right has 
been infringed or threatened to be infringed, but the entire litigation is based on the 
apprehension that sometime in the indeterminate future there might be an infringement of a 
particular right. This could, for example, flow from the conduct of the state or a particular law 
that exists within the statute books, even though it is hardly used. 
 
Closely related to this are matters that are considered moot. In National Coalition for Gay 
and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Others 2000 
(2) SA 1 (CC), the Constitutional Court of South Africa gave guidance on when a matter can be 
considered as moot. It was said that a case is moot and therefore not justiciable if it no 
longer presents an existing or live controversy, which should exist if the Court is to avoid 
giving advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law. Although the terms “moot”, 
“abstract” and “academic” are often used interchangeably by the courts, it seems that for 
a matter to be moot, there must first exist a legal controversy which, owing to some 
intervening circumstance, has ceased to exist by the time the matter is heard before court. 
Notably, a matter cannot be regarded as moot where the issues have not been resolved or 
become non-existent (Ramuhovhi and Another v The President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others [2016] ZALMPHC 18 para 39). A matter may be abstract without it being 
moot, but a moot matter will always be abstract. 
 
In his dissent, Hlophe J chose to frame his opinion, based on the perceived “abstract nature” 
of the application. However, further reading of his judgment reveals that he also invoked 




entertain a matter if it is premature in the sense that rights have not been infringed or 
threatened (du Plessis, Penfold and Brickhill 2013, 8). In effect, ripeness usually forms part 
of the court’s enquiry, when the litigant has not yet been affected by the unlawfulness 
which grounds his application. At the heart of Hlophe J’s findings was his assertion that the 
question of whether the sections that the applicants sought to have struck down were ripe for 
constitutional consideration. In this regard, he opined in para 37 that “only where one has 
been convicted, can [it] be claim[ed] that the section in question infringes his right 
depending on how the Constitutional Court will decide the matter.” 
 
The concept of ripeness was elucidated by Justice Laurie Ackerman of the South Africa 
Constitutional Court, who said “while the concept of ripeness is not precisely 
 
defined, it embraces a general principle that where it is possible to decide any case, civil or 
criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed” 
(National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality & Others v Minister of Home Affairs & 
Others 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 21). However, the inquiry does not end there. Currie and de 
Waal (2013, 85) assert that: 
 
Ripeness entails consideration of the timing of a constitutional challenge. The fitness of 
the constitutional issue in a case for judicial decision must be weighed alongside the hardship 
to the parties of withholding the court’s consideration. 
 
In other words, the court must ask itself if the applicants would suffer any prejudice by 
waiting for their trial and conviction before making the constitutional challenge. According 
to Hlophe J, he would have preferred that the applicants launch their challenge after 
conviction or acquittal, rather than doing so as free men. 
 
Judge Hlophe’s inverted approach to determining the matter is unfortunate in that ripeness 
correlates with standing, which the Judge did not address in his judgment, save to import it 
covertly through his opinion on ripeness. His reliance on ripeness simply sought to 
demonstrate that the applicants were before the court prematurely. Effectively, this meant that 
they did not satisfy the requirements of section 35 on locus standi. We have already 
exhaustively dealt with the issue of standing above, and given that the main judgment 
accepted, albeit fleetingly, that indeed the applicants had standing, we need not repeat the 
argument here. The challenge brought against the impugned provisions were in no way 
premature, notwithstanding the fact that the prejudice and harm that the applicants would 
suffer appears to have completely escaped the learned Judge. They would be faced with a 
20-year sentence each, with no option of a fine in the event of their conviction. 
Furthermore, their freedom of movement had already been affected since they were out on 
bail when the matter was heard by the court. Currie and de Waal (2013, 86) assert that in a 
case where “the applicant would suffer serious and irreparable harm by being required to 
exhaust the remedy (the criminal trial in this case), it would be unreasonable to delay the 




laying charges against the applicants, citing the two laws, did not render those laws 
unconstitutional. He put it thus in his dissenting opinion (para 38): 
 
It follows therefore, that it would be stretching things too far to say that simply because one 
has been charged with having uttered vacuous statements, which do not prove a seditious 
intention as contemplated in law and (as) interpreted in numerous judgments of this court, 
and the courts from foreign jurisdictions, he can have a statute declared unconstitutionally 
when it did not infringe on any of his rights. 
 
It is an established principle that where a law threatens constitutional rights, it is not 
necessary to wait until the law has been implemented before approaching the court for a 
remedy (Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement of South Africa v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal 
[2009] ZACC 31, para 14). Hlophe J’s reasoning suggests that until the applicants were found 
guilty of the crimes alleged, the law had not come into operation and as such, no rights 
could be said to have been violated. 
 
The deleterious effects of the criminal proceedings on the applicants’ fundamental freedoms 
were not imagined, neither were the concerns raised by the applicants a remote 
possibility somewhere in the indeterminate future. Their fears were by no means fanciful. 
Criminal charges had already been preferred against the applicants, based on those 
provisions. There was therefore, no need to wait until the conclusion of the criminal trial 
before rights could be said to have been violated. Hlophe’s apparent misunderstanding of 
how a Bill of Rights operates led to his second incorrect conclusion, that owing to the 
“prematurity of the constitutional matter”, it was therefore, abstract (para 21). He seemed to 
entertain a flawed idea that abstract always equals waste of time. However, that is not entirely 
true. Abstract challenges (or so called moot challenges) are sometimes allowed by the courts if 
they deal with matters of public importance. In MEC for Education, KZN and Others v Pillay 
[2007] ZACC 21 in para 32, the Constitutional Court held that it may be in the interests of 
justice to hear a matter even if it is moot if any order which the court may make will have 
some practical effect either on the parties or on others. 
 
In Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another [2004] 
ZACC 12, Yacoob J was emphatic that not all abstract applications are self- defeating. He 
opined that the principle was not an invariable one, and that there might be circumstances in 
which it would be in the public interest to litigate in the absence of a live case (para 18). This 
was reiterated in Campus Law Clinic (University of KwaZulu- Natal Durban) v Standard 
Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another [2006] ZACC 5 (para 20). The court went on to lay 
down the following factors as prerequisites to the question whether the court should 
consider an abstract matter: (i) whether there is another reasonable and effective manner 
in which the challenge may be brought; (ii) the nature of the relief sought and the extent to 
which it is of general and prospective application; (iii) the range of persons or groups who 
may be directly or indirectly affected by any order made by the court and the opportunity 




degree of vulnerability of the people affected; (v) the nature of the rights said to be infringed; as 
well as (vi) the consequences of the infringement. This is not a closed list. 
 
Had Judge Hlophe applied the above requirements to the case, he would most likely have 
come to a different conclusion. If one looks at the nature of the relief sought, it becomes 
immediately clear that the applicants wanted to protect their fundamental rights from 
unlawful interference by the state. The freedoms of expression and assembly are very 
important for individual self-fulfilment, and for the democratic process, as they assure 
stability and the contestation of ideas. This is much more so in the Swaziland context, 
where these freedoms were heavily curtailed during the years of colonial rule, and were 
further rendered non-existent for over three decades between independence and the 
adoption of the current Constitution. The relief sought was indeed of general application, as 
the entire population was affected by the restraint imposed by the impugned provisions. 
Further, the order was likely to be applied to similar cases in future. The applicants, being 
individuals who are vocal about their political beliefs were indeed vulnerable in a state where 
repression of political opposition has formed the bedrock of governance and judicial 
processes. The consequences of the infringement included loss of livelihoods, loss of liberty, 
and a violation of a broad range of rights, owing to the incarceration related to the 
criminal trial, for simply expressing their dissatisfaction with the system of government. At 
the time the constitutional challenge was initiated, the applicants were out on bail. 
 
A ground for serious criticism is that the learned Judge, in coming to this conclusion, relied on 
a pre-constitutional era case decided by the Swaziland High Court in 1987. This was the 
case of R v Shongwe, Mphandlana and Others 1987–1995 (4) SLR 184, in which the 
accused were acquitted after it could not be proved that the words they had published, 
“away with the king, “referendum or we bomb” evinced an intention to incite violence. 
With reference to this, Justice Hlophe stated that “where a person charged under this Act 
was acquitted, he obviously cannot talk of his aforesaid right having been infringed” (para 
37). This often repeated statement from the judgment in different ways totally misses the 
point on constitutionalism and the law. Elsewhere, the judge said: “I do not think that a 
serious Act made to curb terrorism can justifiably be struck down simply because it 
happened to be wrongly applied in a situation where it should not” (para 54) 
 
The Judge’s approach runs counter to accepted notions of constitutional supremacy and the 
invalidity of offending laws. When a law is declared invalid it means it was never valid. The 
invalidation is not prompted by the application that came before the judge or any other 
court action. It is not the charges against the applicants that made the law invalid but, rather, 
its standing next to the supremacy of the constitution from the day either of them were 
enacted. Currie and De Waal (2014) maintain that “In principle therefore, the declaration 
invalidates the legislation and any actions taken under the legislation from the moment the 







Onus of proof in constitutional matters 
In South African law, the approach of the courts to onus splits the enquiry into two 
stages—the first being proof of the existence of an infringement, and the second stage aimed 
at establishing the propriety of that infringement in an open and democratic society. 
Hence, from the seminal case of S v Makwanyane [1995] ZACC 3, and throughout 
many cases decided later by the South African courts, the burden of proving that a limiting 
measure is justifiable lies with the party seeking to rely on that measure. It was stated in 
Makwanyane (para 102) that “It is for the legislature, or the party relying on the legislation, to 
establish this justification, and not for the party challenging it to show that it was not 
justified.” 
 
This formula for establishing onus was set out further by Ackermann J in the following 
extract from Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 
[1995] ZACC 13 (para 44): 
 
The task of determining whether the provisions of [an] Act are invalid because they are 
inconsistent with the guaranteed rights here under discussion involves two stages, first, 
an enquiry as to whether there has been an infringement of the [...] guaranteed right; if so, a 
further enquiry as to whether such infringement is justified under [...] the limitation 
clause. The task of interpreting the [...] fundamental rights rests, of course, with the 
Courts, but it is for the applicants to prove the facts upon which they rely for the claim of 
infringement of the particular right in question. Concerning the second stage, [it] is for the 
legislature or the party relying on the legislation to establish this justification [in terms of 
the limitation clause], and not for the party challenging it, to show that it was not justified. 
 
In Moise v Greater Germiston Transitional Council [2001] ZACC 21 (para 18), it was stated 
that although the burden of justification under section 36 is no ordinary onus, failure by 
government to submit such data and argument may in appropriate cases tip the scales against 
it and result in the invalidation of the challenged enactment. 
 
Further, in Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-
Integration of Offenders (NICRO) and Others [2004] ZACC 10 (para 36) it was stated 
that 
 
Where justification depends on factual material, the party relying on justification must 
establish the facts on which the justification depends…a failure to place such information 
before the court, or to spell out the reasons for the limitation, may be fatal to the justification 
claim. 
 
In the case of Maseko and Others v Prime Minister of Swaziland and Others [2016] SZHC 
180, the onus was on the state, which ought to have advanced proof that the limitation 
placed on freedom of expression was justifiable in an open and democratic society. The state 





To support the finding that the applicant bore the onus of proof, Judge Hlophe did not rely 
on any case law, save to state that he agreed with the arguments raised by the respondent 
(para 47). The respondent’s argument was simply that in Swaziland, unlike in other 
jurisdictions, the onus of proving that offending legislation is justifiable lies with the 
applicant. This approach raises serious concerns and is steeped very heavily in pre-
constitutional era judicial reasoning. It seeks to paint Swaziland as a unique legal system, 
totally divorced from legal developments in the broader global context. This is not the case, 
and the adherence to the past ignores the point raised by Mamba J in the main judgment, 
that the Constitution is a living document, and that it affirmed the universality of human 
rights (para 41). What compounds Judge Hlophe’s approach is that it overlooks the fact 
that the Constitution contains, in material respects, a new and fundamental commitment 
to human rights, and is not merely a contemporising and incremental articulation of 
previously accepted and entrenched values shared in our society (Shabalala v The 
Attorney General of Transvaal [1995] ZACC 12 para 28). To that end, it is a document 
that ought to enforce a sharp departure with the past of boasting about a “unique way” of 
doing things in the Swaziland context; where democratic norms and values are deemed 
foreign to the “Swazi way of life.” It ought to jettison the repression, inequality and 
authoritarianism that characterised the colonial period and period of the rule by royal 
decree. The constitutional text is premised on the aspirations of a future based on 
democracy and popular participation, which ought to create a legal culture of accountability 
and transparency. Judge Hlophe’s assertions negate all those constitutional objectives. 
 
In para 46 of his dissenting judgment, Judge Hlophe incorrectly relied on The King v 
Swaziland Independent Publishers [2013] SZHC 88 para 91—however, that judgment simply 
affirms the position that rights are not absolute, and it does not support the argument 
that the onus to prove that the violation is unjustifiable is on the applicant. A reading of the 
judgment in The King v Swaziland Independent Publishers case reveals that Judge Hlophe 
did not read the entire judgment, but merely cut out a paragraph that would support his 
assumed legal position and disregarded legal precedent. The judge seems to have merely 
come to the conclusion he wanted, without any case law or legal principle supporting his 
finding. In para 91, the judgment he relied on deals with the fact that rights are not 
absolute, whilst in para 92, it underscores the position that the duty to prove that a 
limitation is justifiable in the Swaziland context lies with the respondent, as in most 
advanced legal systems, and not the applicant as the judge held. In para 94, it clearly states 
that “[t]he onus of proving that the limitation is reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society lies with the party seeking to uphold the limitation.” It is a matter of concern that the 
judge did not give any weight to the multitude of case law from persuasive jurisdictions 
indicating that the onus to prove that a limitation is justifiable lies with the party alleging 
such justification. Further, Swaziland courts have long embraced this legal position as well. 
This does not bode well for the development of jurisprudence on the limitation of rights in the 
Swaziland jurisdiction. It is noteworthy though, that Justice Yacoob, in Phillips and Another v 
Director of Public Prosecutions and Others [2003] ZACC 1 (para 20) stated that “the absence 
of evidence and argument from the state does not exempt the court from the obligation to 




indirectly support Judge Hlophe’s approach, sight must not be lost of the fact that what is 
unacceptable here is the fact that a new legal principle was created in vacuo, and in total 
disregard of a litany of cases, both from with n and without Swaziland, favouring the 
position that the state bears the onus of proof. 
 
Failure to Apply the Rules of Constitutional Interpretation 
In his judgment, Hlophe J stated that he did not see any relations between the charges 
against the applicants and the constitutionality of the sections they sought to impugn. The 
learned Judge pointed out that had he heard the criminal case (as he was scheduled to since it 
had been allocated to him), he would likely have acquitted them, because there was no 
correlation between the charges laid against them, and the sections in the Sedition Act and 
the Suppression of Terrorism Act cited by the prosecution. In paragraph 15 of his dissent, he 
stated: 
 
[t]hat one has for instance been charged with a ridiculous charge does not make the Act 
supposedly relied upon unconstitutional, particularly where the court could possibly find that 
the conduct in question does not even violate the section concerned … 
 
Justice Hlophe devoted a large portion of his judgment to dealing with the question 
whether it was necessary for the applicants to challenge the constitutionality of the 
sections under which they were charged before their trial. His line of reasoning was that 
the prosecuting authority may have misdirected itself in using the wrong law to prosecute 
the accused and that, in and of itself, did not render the law unconstitutional. However, this 
line of reasoning does not seem to be supported by any evidence, neither did the state 
advance such an argument in its submissions. 
 
The applicants had complained of the words used in the impugned provisions as being 
vague and overbroad. These include words such as disaffection, discontent and “exciting of 
ill-feelings.” In other words, their expressions were said to have caused ill- feelings and 
disaffection amongst the Swazi populace. It is of concern that these words could be the basis 
for restricting freedom of expression in a constitutional and democratic state that Swaziland 
claims to be in its Constitution. Discontent and disaffection are endemic to the political 
arena. People holding opposing views will always entertain one or more of these emotions, 
and it would seem that by today’s standards, these emotions are actually political 
currency. A political group and its members will seek to persuade prospective voters by 
creating disaffection with the manner in which their opponent handles certain policy and 
governance issues. That is what the applicants were doing, merely voicing their disaffection 
towards the “monarchical democracy system of government”. 
 
Constitutional interpretation differs slightly from ordinary interpretation of statutes. It takes 
into account various factors, all of which are aimed at assisting the court to protect fundamental 
rights and uphold the rule of law. Indeed, in Shabalala v The Attorney General of 
Transvaal [1995] ZACC 12 para 27, it was held that a supreme constitution must be given a 




particular, are interpreted purposively to avoid the “austerity of tabulated legalism.” Such an 
approach is necessary since it enables the court to take into account more than legal rules 
(Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana (1994) 1 BCLR 92 (B) at 566G). During the 
interpretation of the Constitution, its spirit and tenor must be adhered to, because the 
Constitution is a “mirror reflecting the national soul” (S v Acheson 1991 (2) SA 805 
(NmHC) at 813 A-B). In other words, the values and moral standards that underpin this 
document must be taken into account throughout the interpretation process. 
 
In the Swaziland Constitution, such values are to be found in the preamble. The preamble 
provides, amongst other things, that 
 
Whereas it is necessary to protect and promote the fundamental rights and freedoms of ALL 
in our Kingdom in terms of a constitution which binds the Legislature, the Executive, the 
Judiciary and the other Organs and Agencies of the Government. 
 
Further, section 1(1) provides that “Swaziland is a unitary, sovereign, democratic 
Kingdom.” In a democratic state, dissenting political opinions would not be suppressed 
through vague and overbroad prohibitions such as those contained in the impugned 
provisions. 
 
Various interpretive aids are useful in this exercise. One such aid is the history of human 
rights violations. The historical context is critical in assessing the intention of the drafters of 
the Constitution. Yet this did not feature in Judge Hlophe’s analysis of the meaning of 
amorphous words such as “disaffection”, “discontent” and “exciting ill- feelings.” There is no 
shortage of illustrations of human rights violations, particularly political rights such as 
expression, association and assembly in the Swaziland context. Context is fundamental to 
constitutional interpretation. A provision of the constitution cannot be interpreted in 
isolation, but must be read in the context as a whole. The context includes the historical 
factors that led to the adoption of the constitution in general, and the fundamental rights 
in particular (S v Makwanyane, para 10). In the Swaziland context, where for decades, 
royal decrees meant that activities of opposition parties were criminalised under the King’s 
Proclamation to the Nation of 12 April 1973, courts ought to interpret freedom of expression 
broadly, in line with the aspirations of an open and democratic society (Dube and Nhlabatsi 
2016, 267). After all, the motivation for adopting a new constitution, as contained in the 
preamble included the protection and promotion of fundamental rights as well as desire to 
start afresh, and to achieve full freedom and independence. We argue that had the learned 
Judge applied the now established principles of constitutional interpretation, the offending 
provisions would not have passed the constitutional muster; for they perpetuated the 
repressions that existed under the colonial era, as well as under the era of rule by royal 
decree between 1973 and 2006. 
 
Judicial endorsement of abuse of prosecutorial discretion? 
Hlophe J chastised the applicants for bringing the application, but did not condemn the 




in the case at hand). In paragraph 35 of his dissenting judgment, the learned Judge opined 
that 
 
[n]o material whatsoever, is placed before this court to enable it to determine whether in fact 
there would in law be any basis for the criminal charges they are faced with. In other words, 
whether the offences they are charged with are sustainable or not. They want to say simply 
because they were charged with the alleged offences, it was the pieces of [l]egislation 
complained of that provided they be charged with the specific offences or put differently, 
that simply because they were so charged... 
 
But the Judge apparently ignored the fact that prosecutorial authority in Swaziland vests with 
the DPP in terms of section 162(4) (a) of the Constitution. This is not a function of the court as 
Judge Hlophe implies. Courts are enjoined by the law to acquit an accused person if 
ridiculous charges have been brought against them. Further, he seemed to be suggesting that 
apart from establishing that the law in question violates a fundamental right, the applicants 
should have proceeded to convince the court on whether the case against them was 
“sustainable or not.” This suggests a new requirement in constitutional litigation, one which 
has no basis, neither in case law nor in the Constitution. After all, this court was not called 
upon to pronounce on the guilt or otherwise of the applicants.  
 
It is notable that in September 2009, one of the applicants in the current matter, Mario 
Masuku, was acquitted in a different case on a charge under the Suppression of Terrorism 
Act, after he was kept in custody for almost 11 months (R v Masuku [2009] SZHC 220). 
When Justice Mamba acquitted Masuku at the close of the crown’s case, not only did he 
find the indictment was badly worded, but also that the investigating officer had given 
testimony that was irrelevant to the matter. The Judge also found that some of the 
witnesses in the case had tried to manufacture evidence in order to get a conviction (R v 
Masuku paras 11 and 12). Therefore, it is our contention that by challenging the law itself in 
this case the applicants were, inter alia, seeking to avoid yet another frivolous trial, as the 
DPP has made it a habit of taking them to court from time to time. 
 
Conclusion 
The Swaziland courts are faced with the mammoth task of applying the Constitution to 
eliminate deeply entrenched human rights violations, which can be traced back to the 
colonial era. The fact that the King’s Proclamation to the Nation remains unrepealed, 
neither by way of a court decision nor by any other legislative means, signifies that 
political rights will remain in limbo until a progressive court interprets the Constitution to 
strike down that royal decree. Whilst the reasoning of the main judgment that the 
Constitution is a living document, the main purpose of which is to usher in transformation and 
erase past injustices, the various positions taken by the dissenting judgment of Hlophe J 
are very alarming. These positions cannot be reconciled with an open and democratic 
society which Swaziland claims to be. The Judge’s opinion also perpetuates dangerous notions 
associated with the austerity of tabulated legalism; and is not suited to a socio-legal and 




violates fundamental rights with impunity. The Judge’s opinion also poses the risk of eroding 
public confidence in the judiciary. 
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